Immigration has been popularised in the economics literature as a tool that could be used to balance troubled PAYG pension systems. Pivotal research by Razin and Sadka shows that unskilled immigration can overcome the pension problem and, further, boost the general welfare in the host economy. However, a large strand of current economics research is engaged in identifying mechanisms through which unskilled immigration, while solving the pension problem, is causing undesired shifts in general welfare. This work shows that recurring unskilled immigration will not only reduce the general welfare, but may be challenging the very pension system by reducing the pension benefits themselves. Further, interpreting the actual data, it is suggested that immigration policies are designed either based on public finances only or in a political environment of gerontocracy .
ity. When they age, they increase the number of claims on benefits; however, their children would then contribute to the pension system (and bring back the initial equilibrium).
Since Razin and Sadka (1999) much has been written to show various channels through which increases in unskilled immigration could decrease the general welfare (hence implying that demographic reforms are not preferred to parametric reforms). Thus, Razin and Sadka (2000) claim that the pension benefits are increased with increased unskilled immigration, but, in the case of closed economies, the wages would decline and thus hurt those who mostly rely on labour for income. Casarico and Devillanova (2003) noted that a wage decline caused by an influx of unskilled immigrants would change the skill distribution among the natives in the host economy. They show the changes that come with the possibility of endogenous skill upgrades can cause many inter-and intra-generational welfare re-distribution conflicts. Jinno (2011) develops the idea further incorporating the possibility of an endogenous skill upgrade for the immigrants as well while noting that there are some assimilation costs. The results suggest further re-distributional conflicts. Krieger (2004) claims that welfare impairment and re-distribution already occur when high immigrant fertility rates and the low skill levels of immigrant children are accounted for. Kemnitz (2003 Kemnitz ( , 2008 introduces the problem of unemployment into the analysis. He claims that unskilled immigration increases unemployment and harms the unskilled natives even though there is a boon to general welfare. Muysken Many large-scale computational studies have been conducted in order to analyse whether immigration can make the PAYG pension systems sustainable. Thus, Lee and Miller (2000) and Storesletten (2000) model the US economy and conclude that some immigration can help alleviate the aging problem of the baby-boom generation. Schou (2006) presents a similar detailed study for Denmark and concludes that immigrants are net beneficiaries of the public pension system while their contribution to economic growth is marginal. More recently, Chojnicki, Docquier, and Ragot (2012) presented a retrospective study on the US economy and concluded that a higher level of immigration would have been beneficial to the general welfare of the population. However, their study was concentrated on the short-to medium-term effects of immigration and did not study possible long-term effects.
Meanwhile, there is a strand of literature claiming that only an excessively large inflow of immigrants can help sustain the pension system. For instance, Ubelmesser (2004) claims that the EU cannot accommodate as many migrants as is needed for pension system sustainability and claims that parametric reforms are also necessary. Blake and Mayhew (2006) study a combination of parametric reforms with immigration, claiming that the need for immigrants into the UK will be constantly growing if the pension system is not reformed. Serrano, Eguía and Ferreiro (2011) claim that even with recent, large immigration, it is not possible to sustain the current Spanish pension system, and parametric reforms are inevitable.
The current paper, claiming that under certain conditions unskilled immigration may result in lower pension benefits (with pension contributions being fixed), shows that increased immigration is not desirable. The paper utilises the idea of a multi-period immigration policy, i.e. immigrants enter the economy each period as opposed to the one-time-migrant-inflow framework of Razin and Sadka (2000) .
While in the Razin and Sadka model the old equilibrium is restored after a number of periods, multi-period immigration results in a new equilibrium, distinct from the initial one. This allows studying the reaction of the economy in full, i.e. both in the new equilibrium and on the transition path. An important channel that links unskilled immigration to pensions is studied: The paper employs the framework of several recent publications by Gori (2010, 2012 ) that follows the dynamics of per-capita capital in a Diamond-type overlapping-generations model. Thus, the paper connects unskilled immigration to distortions in savings and demographics that result in lower capital per capita and thus in generally lower wages. Hence, even though pension benefits grow compared to wages (as in Razin and Sadka, 1999), wages may decrease such that benefits are less than what they would be without the immigrants.
The current paper also complements the literature that studies the negative spiral of the PAYG system and demography (e.g. Cigno, 2006; Cipriani, 2013) , as it shows how designed immigration policy intended for supporting the system actually burdens it further.
In line with the literature, general welfare changes are also discussed: Such a study in the heterogeneous agent framework allows analysing the political feasibility of immigration policy reform. Similar to Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri (2011) and Lacomba and Lagos (2010) , the current paper identifies those policies that the current population might favour. Furthermore, in contrast to Lacomba and Lagos, this paper allows the population to chose immigrant skill level and follows the long-term welfare effects of the adopted policies. Numerical examples are used to support the results of the theoretical framework.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the economic environment. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and provides the pension system analysis under migration. Section 4 analyses the political equilibrium and transitional dynamics, and the concluding remarks are in the final section.
The Economic Environment
Two overlapping generations exist in a closed economy. During the first period of their lives the agents work (for remuneration), save and consume. For the second period the agents consume their pension benefits and savings. The firm organises production by hiring labour and capital from households. The government collects the pension contributions from the working-age young and distributes them within retired (old-age) population. All markets clear.
Population
Each period young migrants are allowed into the country equal to µ share of the native young. Thus, the total working-age population in the economy is:
where N t is the size of the native-born population with the following dynamics.
where it is assumed that immigrants and their descendants have the same fertility rate (n − 1). However, the immigrants have only ε of the skill level of the native population. Thus, the efficient labour in the country at any time is:
and is different from the total size of the population. 
Households
Each household is represented by a single agent that solves a lifetime utility maximisation problem:
subject to the budget constraints:
where i shows the status in the country (native born or migrant), c i,t and s i,t are, respectively, the consumption and savings of type i agent at time t, e i shows the efficiency of the worker (which is unity for native born and ε for immigrants), τ is the tax rate that has two components τ = τ d − τ er , where τ d and τ er are, respectively, the pension contribution rates to the demogrant and earnings-related pension systems, p d t is the demogrant benefit received equally by all of the retired, while p er i,t is the earning-related pension benefits that each retired agent receives according to own contribution:
where ϕ t is the pension replacement rate.
Optimal household savings take the value
where
, ϕ e t+1 , w e t+1 and r e t+1 are the expected values of the pension benefits, replacement rate, wage, and interest rate respectively.
Firms
There is one firm that uses the Cobb-Douglas production function 1 with an α share of capital. Hence, the usual optimality conditions hold:
where k t is the capital per effective labour.
The Pension System
Two parallel pension systems will be accounted for: a demogrant (Beveridgean tradition) system that evenly distributes the income over the retired population and the earnings-related pension system (Bismarckian tradition) that is actuarially fair. Pension systems run periodically balanced budgets, i.e. the contributions collected are given out as benefits. Thus, the earnings-related pension system can be presented as
Using (2) and (3), the earnings-related benefit size can be calculated as
where p er i,t = p er t e i is the (efficiency-weighted) pension that type i agent gets at period t. Similarly, the demogrant system can be represented as
Using (1) and (3), the pension benefits can be calculated as
i.e., as in Razin & Sadka (1999) the first-order effect of the immigrants on pensions is strictly positive.
Equilibrium
Given the parameter values, α, β, ε, µ, τ d , τ er , and the initial values K o , N o , the equilibrium is an allocation {c i,t , s i,t , p t } and a price vector (w t , r t ) such that the population follows the dynamics given by (1) and (3), households optimise their problem (4)- (7), the firm optimises so that (9) and (10) hold, pension budgets (11) and (13) are balanced, and the capital market clears, i.e.
It is assumed that the economy starts in a steady state with no migration. Once immigration is allowed, the economy undergoes a transition and eventually reaches a new, post-migration steady state.
Post-Migration Capital
Aggregate capital in the economy can be calculated based on (15), using the population dynamics (2) and the optimal savings (8). Thus,
Using (3), (9), (10), and (14) and assuming that agents have rational expectations, the dynamics of capital per effective labour can be obtained:
that solves for the steady state equilibrium value:
As it can be immediately observed, the capital per effective labour decreases with the size of the immigrant population. However, the post-migration steady state level of capital (18) does not depend on the skill level of the immigrants:
Though the immigrants have lower skill level, and thus earn and save less than the natives, in the steady state they are matched to the next period immigrant population that is equal in size and skill level, and thus they do not change the level of the capital per effective labour. Meanwhile, those immigrants father children that are not matched by any savings and thus lower the level of capital available to each effective labour unit. Hence, the capital dilution observed in the postimmigration steady state is caused not by the immigrants per se, but rather by the children of those immigrants.
Post-Migration Pension Benefits
As in the previous section, two pension systems will be discussed separately: The equilibrium value of the demogrant pension benefits can be obtained by substituting the steady state wage rate into (14):
does not change with the size or skill level of the immigrant population. Thus, to understand the effect of immigration on the demogrant pension benefits, it is sufficient to find the sign of the derivative of (19) :
Proposition 1 Demogrant pension benefits decrease with the size of the immigrant population if the skill level of immigrants (compared to natives) is
Proof. The pension benefits decrease if the derivate (20) is negative. Since the first part (the ratio) of the product on the right-hand side of (20) is a positive constant, the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the second part and is negative given that the conditions above would be satisfied.
The proposition effectively claims that even though post-migration pensions are higher compared to wages, the immigration-caused capital dilution may be stronger and result in wages that generate lower pension benefits compared to their pre-migration levels. In more detail, the logic is as follows: In post-migration steady state the efficient population dynamics is stabilised on the level of immigration size (1 + µ), which (given the diminishing marginal returns) results in a capital dilution with the size of (1 + µ) immigrants with even sixty-five per cent of local efficiency already will force the pension benefits to decrease, as the immigrants' extra contribution to the pension system will not be enough to cover the wage loss caused by capital dilution.
In the case of earnings-related pensions, the behaviour of the post-migration steady state value of the benefits:
are obtained by substituting the equilibrium wage rate into (12) , and can be studied similarly:
Proposition 2 Earnings-related pension benefits increase with the size of the immigrant population when α < 1/2, and decrease otherwise.
Proof. Directly follows from (22) .
Hence, in the case of an earnings-related pension system, as opposed to a demogrant pension system, the pension benefits always grow (in the economically meaningful case of α < 1/2). This result is due to the fact that an actuarially fair distribution of earnings-related pensions guarantees that relative benefits increase more (a multiple of (1 + µ)) than the effective wage decrease (a multiple of (1 + µ) on pension benefits will be ambiguous.
Post-Migration General Welfare
Aside from the effects of immigration on pension benefits, immigration also affects the other components of the general welfare -wages and return to capital. The lifetime utility of agents (4) can be rewritten as
Capital dilution caused by immigration (18) will result in lower wages (9) and higher return to capital (10) that, combined with the conflicting results of the propositions 1 and 2, make the total effect of the immigration on general welfare ambiguous.
For the sake of analytical tractability an environment without pensions is studied, i.e. τ d = τ d = 0. This allows to analyse the effects of immigration on 2 Bismarckian factor (Cremer & Pestieau, 1998 ) is a measure of the actuarial fairness of pension systems. It takes values between 0 and 1, with 0 characterising a purely redistributive (demogrant, Beveridgean) pension system and 1 -a strictly actuarially fair (earnings related, Bismarckian) pension system. In the present stylised model the Bismarckian factor can be presented as τ er / τ er + τ d . 3 This result could be used to explain the extra mobility restrictions that the UK employs for the migrants from the new EU member states -Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania.
non-pension-related welfare and on pensions separately. This separation, however, is based on an assumption that the existence of the pension systems does not significantly distort the savings decision (or alternatively that pension systems are not large). Hence, the results should be treated as an approximation to the general welfare. 
Political Equilibrium
There are numerous ways how immigration policies might be initiated. Here two alternatives are studied: immigration policy set by a social planner and policy based on public choice (voting).
Following Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012), a social planner is maximising general welfare using some weights for each group. Usually, the farther away the group is in time the less weight they get. Still, if the social planner does not discount the future heavily and bases the decision on the effect of immigration on the public finances (pensions in this case), the equilibrium solution will be in line with the corollary to propositions 1 and 2, i.e. small-sized and highly skilled immigration will be supported in an economy with a low BF, and larger-sized immigration in the case of a high BF. However, if the social planner bases the decision on the general welfare, the equilibrium will be in line with the above conjecture, i.e. very limited highly skilled immigration will be allowed.
Conversely, following Lacomba and Lagos (2010) and Razin et al. (2011), a
public choice approach can be adopted. That is, it is assumed that agents populating the economy in the initial period vote for the policy based on the economic self-interest, i.e. they vote for the policy that guarantees higher general welfare.
Further, it is assumed that the policy will be intact once it is voted for. This approach requires studying the welfare of the initial young and retired population.
Thus, using (17) , the capital dilution caused by immigration in the initial two periods can be presented as
so, wages and interest rates will accordingly be
and 1 + r 1 = 1 +r
1 + r 2 = 1 +r
wherek,ŵ, andr are the pre-migration steady state levels of the capital per effective labour, wage, and return to capital, respectively.
The initial retired population face their savings from the previous period combined with higher returns caused by capital dilution. Furthermore, Proposition 4 Both demogrant and earnings-related pension benefits increase with the size of the immigrant population in the first post-migration period.
Proof. From (12), (14) and (26) followŝ
Though in the first post-migration period the efficient wages are less compared to their previous steady state levels, pension benefits, both demogrant and earnings-related, still increase based on improved demographics. Thus, the initial retired population only gain from any immigration and, further, the higher the skill level of the immigrant population the more they gain.
In the post-migration environment the initial young population face lower wages, higher return to savings, and ambiguous pension benefits. For the sake of analytical tractability the lifetime utility (23) will again be studied in two disjoint cases:
pension benefits and utility without pensions. Thus,
The only non-constant part of the utility function is the last term on the right-hand side of (32) and it increases with the size of immigration and decreases with the efficiency level, making the initial young population favour low-skilled immigration.
The logical interpretation of the result is as follows: Starting from the second period the native-born immigrant children cause capital dilution that results in higher return to capital (savings), and, as the size of the native-born immigrant children is equal to the size of immigrant population, the initial young population prefers large immigration. However, the initial young face those immigrants on the labour market and compete with them for the efficient wage. Thus, the initial young population prefer large-scale low-skilled immigrant population.
As in the case of initial retired population the pre-and post-migration pension benefits for the initial young (second period retired) population can be calculated.
Proposition 5
In the second post-migration period the earnings-related pension benefits increase with the size of immigrant population if
and decrease otherwise.
Proof. Based on (12) and (27):
As before the pre-migration steady state value of the earnings-related pension benefits isp er = τ er nŵ, which is less than p er 2 if the above condition is satisfied, while otherwisep er > p er 2 .
Proposition 6
In the second post-migration period the demogrant pension benefits increase with the size of immigrant population if
Proof. Based on (14) and (27):
As before the pre-migration steady state value of the earnings-related pension
As proposition (5) shows, immigration increases the level of earnings-related pension benefit, i.e. p er 2 >p er , under rather permissive condition. However, in order for the second post-migration period demogrant pension benefits to be higher than the pre-migration level, rather restrictive constraint needs to be satisfied.
That is, because of the redistributive nature of demogrant pension system immigration of low-skilled migrants decreases the pension benefits. Similar to the corollary to the propositions 1 and 2, it can be concluded that the effect of the immigration on the pension benefits depends on the size and the skill level of the immigrant population as well as on the BF. A conjecture (similar to the one in the section above) can be made to claim that in the case of a high BF the initial young population will benefit from low skilled immigration; and in the case of a low BF environment they will benefit from the same if the pension benefit losses are not excessively large.
Hence in political equilibrium, with public voting, the initial population (both young and retired) will vote for the positive migration of low-efficiency immigrants though in the long-term that policy is welfare impairing for future generations. 4 
Numerical Example
This section uses examples of the United Kingdom and Germany to discuss results and conjectures of the previous sections. The two countries have been chosen as the two extremes: While the United Kingdom has implemented tight immigration policy (despite EU directives) and has exercised a fully distributive pension system (low BF), Germany has been more liberal in immigration policy (supporting EU free labour movement and Aussiedler return policies) and has exercised more actuarially fair pension system (high BF).
For both countries there is a working assumption that α = .4, and immigration µ = 5 per cent. The tax rates are chosen so that they match the Bismarckian factors provided in Krieger & Traub (2013) and the pension replacement rates from ( Table 7 [Insert figure 1 here] The results of the proposition 4, i.e. pure gains in pension benefits for initial retired people, are clearly visible for both countries (the right-hand side of the rows). 
Conclusion
The challenge from growing ageing population on unfunded public pensions has long been studied in economics. Possible measures are fewer pension benefits, larger contributions (including late retirement), fertility enhancement programmes, and replacement immigration. A vast literature now exists dealing with the last.
At the height of the discussion, Razin and Sadka (1999) However, the current work counter-argues the very idea of unskilled immigrants serving to sustain the pension system. It is shown that while the unskilled immigration increases pension benefits compared to wages, it decreases capital available per each worker and, thus, also wages. As a result the demogrant pension benefits (the one used in Razin and Sadka, 1999) decrease.
However, the earnings-related (actuarially fair, Bismarckian) pensions, which are widely found in many countries combined with demogrant pensions, are shown to generate higher pension benefits compared to pre-immigration levels. Thus the effect of low-skilled migration on overall pension levels depends on the share of earnings-related pension benefits (the Bismarckian factor) and the level of immi-grant labour efficiency.
Further it is shown that the overall welfare of all agents (with the exception of the initial population) decreases with unskilled immigrants. Meanwhile, the initial retired population benefit from immigration (still preferring better skilled migrants) due to direct pension benefit increases, and the initial young population prefer migrants with low skill only in order to boost the interest on their savings while faced with little loss in wage rates. As a result, should a policy be set based on the preferences of the current population (i.e. if public choice prevails), an unskilled immigration policy would be established resulting in reduced pension benefits (and welfare) for future population. The real data interpretation of the model suggests that either political gerontocracy prevails in the discussed European states or the immigration policy is set on the basis of public finances only. 
